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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






In re:  WASHINGTON MUTUAL, INC., et al., Debtors 
 
 
ALICE GRIFFIN, Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D.C. No. 1-19-cv-00775) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2020 
 
Before:  McKEE, PORTER, FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 






FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal arises out of the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Washington Mutual, 
Inc. (WMI). Appellant Alice Griffin was a holder of WMI preferred stock whose 
shares were canceled pursuant to WMI’s 2012 plan of reorganization. Under the plan, 
Griffin and other preferred shareholders became members of “Class 19,” the plan’s 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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“Preferred Equity Interest” class.1 In 2019, Griffin objected to a settlement that diluted 
her interests in Class 19. That settlement, negotiated by the appellee Liquidating Trust 
in 2013, allowed a disputed $72 million claim brought by certain securities 
underwriters. The Bankruptcy Court overruled Griffin’s objection. On appeal, the 
District Court affirmed. Griffin now appeals a second time, alleging multiple errors. 
We will affirm.2 
I.3 
The Bankruptcy Court overruled Griffin’s objection on two grounds. It stated 
first: “I believe that the equitable doctrine of laches precludes this objection from 
being prosecuted at this time,” i.e., six years after the settlement.4 Second, it explained 
 
1 App. 834. 
2 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 1334. The 
District Court had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). “We assess our 
own appellate jurisdiction in the first instance.” Seneca Res. Corp. v. Twp. of 
Highland, Elk Cty., Pa., 863 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2017). Although neither party here 
contends this appeal is moot, “[o]ur ‘continuing obligation’ to assure that we have 
jurisdiction requires that we raise issues of . . . mootness sua sponte.” Id. (quoting 
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2007)). This appeal is 
not moot. The underlying bankruptcy case is now closed and the Trust has made its 
final distribution, but we cannot say these developments “make[] it impossible for the 
court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). 
Were Griffin to prevail on the merits and the settlement to be set aside, her pro rata 
share of the initial distribution made to members of Class 19—including to the 
underwriters—would increase accordingly. Meaningful relief therefore remains 
possible. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1), 1291. 
3 “We ‘exercise the same standard of review as the District Court [did] when it 
reviewed the original appeal from the Bankruptcy Court.’” In re S.S. Body Armor I 
Inc, 961 F.3d 216, 224 (3d Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Binder & 
Binder, P.C. v. Handel (In re Handel), 570 F.3d 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2009)). Thus, we 
review the Bankruptcy Court’s approval of the disputed settlement for an abuse of 
discretion. In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 391 (3d Cir. 1996). 
4 App. 45. 
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that even if laches did not apply, Griffin’s objection failed on the merits because 
“th[e] settlement was not in bad faith, was not a breach of fiduciary duty, but really 
was a proper exercise of the liquidating trust[’s] obligation under the trust 
agreement.”5 The District Court affirmed on the second ground, noting that “the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision adequately rests on its approval of the merits of the 
settlement.”6 The District Court did not rule on laches. 
Griffin contends this was error. In her view, laches was “the sole basis” for the 
Bankruptcy Court’s decision and “the District Court was required to review [it].”7 We 
disagree. Where “two independent reasons support a decision, neither can be 
considered obiter dictum; each represents a valid holding of the court.”8 Here, the 
Bankruptcy Court analyzed the merits at length. It considered the four factors this 
Court has identified as governing the approval of settlements in bankruptcy.9 It 
concluded that “all those factors support approval of the final settlement by a 
liquidating trustee.”10 The Bankruptcy Court then stated that if the settlement had been 
submitted for approval, it “would have approved it.”11 Griffin cannot credibly dismiss 
these conclusions as judicial “musings.”12 The record demonstrates that they were 
 
5 App. 47. 
6 App. 67. 
7 Appellant’s Br. 13. 
8 United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315, 319 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
9 See Martin, 91 F.3d at 393. 
10 App. 46. 
11 App. 48. 
12 Appellant’s Br. 13. 
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rather “independent reasons support[ing] [the] decision.”13 Accordingly, it was “a 
valid holding” of the Bankruptcy Court that Griffin’s objection failed on the merits.14 
The District Court was free to affirm on that basis.15 
“We [too] may affirm on any basis supported by the record.”16 Because we 
agree that the Trust acted appropriately in settling the underwriters’ claims, we need 
not address Griffin’s laches argument. Instead, we turn to the settlement. 
II. 
“[T]he ultimate issue on appeal is whether the [B]ankruptcy [C]ourt abused its 
discretion when it []approved the compromise” between the Trust and the 
underwriters.17 That compromise did two things. First, it disallowed from Class 18 
(ahead of Griffin) a $24 million indemnification claim related to the underwriting of 
WMI debt securities. Second, it allowed in Class 19 (Griffin’s class) a $72 million 
indemnification claim related to the underwriting of WMI equity securities. 
In considering whether to approve this settlement, the Bankruptcy Court was 
required “to assess and balance the value of the claim[s] . . . being compromised 
 
13 Shakir, 616 F.3d at 319 n.1. 
14 Id. 
15 See Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Techs., Inc., 57 F.3d 
1215, 1224 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming the District Court, which had “affirmed the 
[B]ankruptcy [C]ourt’s [decision] . . . by finding three alternative grounds for 
upholding [it]”); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937) (“In the review of 
judicial proceedings the rule is settled that, if the decision below is correct, it must be 
affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong 
reason.”). 
16 TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019). 
17 Martin, 91 F.3d at 393. 
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against the value to the estate of the acceptance of the compromise proposal.”18 Four 
factors guide this assessment: “(1) the probability of success in litigation; (2) the 
likely difficulties in collection; (3) the complexity of the litigation involved, and the 
expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount 
interest of the creditors.”19 
We find no abuse of discretion in the Bankruptcy Court’s consideration of 
these factors, and we agree they favor approval of the settlement. First, the Trust’s 
probability of success in litigation was uncertain. Griffin contends that our precedent 
made its objection to the underwriters’ claims a slam dunk.20 But even assuming the 
case law was on its side, the Trust still needed to show that the relevant precedents 
applied. It still needed to rebut the underwriters’ counterarguments. And even then, as 
Griffin acknowledges, a subset of the claims might well have survived as “potential 
obligations of WMI.”21 Success in litigation was hardly guaranteed. 
Nor do the remaining factors cast doubt on the Trust’s decision to settle. The 
second factor, likely difficulties in collection, is not relevant here because the Trust 
was not seeking to collect on the underwriters’ claims, but to defeat them. The third, 




20 She cites Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1995) and In re 
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001). In Eichenholtz, we observed that 
“federal courts [generally] disallow claims for indemnification because such claims 
run counter to the policies underlying the federal securities acts.” 52 F.3d at 484. In 
Cendant, we cited Eichenholtz for the proposition “that there [is] no express or 
implied right to indemnification under the federal securities law.” 264 F.3d at 301. 
21 Appellant’s Br. 37. 
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heavily in favor of settlement. Griffin does not disagree. Finally, settlement was 
appropriate under the fourth factor, the paramount interest of the creditors. Allowance 
of the underwriters’ $72 million claim in Class 19 slightly reduced Griffin’s pro rata 
share of the initial distribution, but on net the settlement benefited Class 19 by 
eliminating a $24 million senior claim, thereby increasing the odds of an additional 
payout. 
III. 
We decline to reach Griffin’s three remaining arguments. First, she asserts that 
the settlement was an ultra vires act and a breach of the Trust’s fiduciary duty. But 
she fails to cite any legal authority in support of these claims, and her attempt to 
incorporate by reference her arguments before the Bankruptcy Court and the District 
Court “does not satisfy the rules of appellate procedure.”22 
Second, Griffin challenges “how the [settlement] was implemented.”23 No such 
argument was raised before the Bankruptcy Court. “We generally do not consider 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal and will not do so in this case.”24 
Lastly, Griffin requests a reasonable fee for her efforts to improve the 
settlement. She cites two independent grounds for the requested fee award.25 Neither 
accompanied her one-line request to the Bankruptcy Court for “costs and fees 
 
22 Norman v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 111, 130 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(8) (requiring the appellant to present her “argument,” including her “contentions 
and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities . . . on which [she] relies”). 
23 Appellant’s Br. 34. 
24 Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 793 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(citation omitted). 
25 11 U.S.C. § 503(a), (b)(5); In re S.S. Body Armor I, 961 F.3d at 225. 
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associated with bringing the Objection.”26 Griffin’s new grounds are really new 
arguments presented for the first time on appeal. We decline to consider them. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
 
26 App. 1561. 
